Cheran Properties Limited Versus Kasturi And Sons Limited And Ors

The group of companies doctrine has been applied to pierce the corporate veil to locate the “true” party in interest, and more significantly, to target the creditworthy member of a group of companies

Case name:Cheran Properties Limited Versus Kasturi And Sons Limited And Ors
Case number:CIVIL APPEAL NOS 10025-10026 OF 2017
Court:THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Bench:DIPAK MISRA,CJI A M KHANWILKAR,J Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD,J
Decided on:April 24, 2018
Relevant Act/Sections:The Companies Act, 2013 The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
  • BRIEF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
    • The second respondent is a company by the name of Sporting Pastime India Limited3. It was incorporated on 2 May 1994, as a fully owned subsidiary of the first respondent, Kasturi & Sons Limited4. On 19 July 2004 an agreement was entered into between KC Palanisamy5 (the third respondent), KSL (the first respondent) and SPIL and a company by the name of Hindcorp Resorts Pvt. Ltd. (Hindcorp).
    • Under the agreement SPIL was to allot 240 lakh equity shares of Rs 10 each, fully paid up at par to KSL against the book debts due by SPIL to KSL. KSL offered to sell to KCP or his nominees 243 lakh equity shares representing 90 per cent of the total paid up share capital for a lumpsum consideration of Rs 2,31,50,000. The intention of the parties, as reflected in the agreement, was that KCP would take over the business, shares and liabilities of SPIL and would discharge the liabilities set out in Schedules 2 and 3 of the agreement which were outstanding on the date of the agreement. KCP agreed to discharge the Schedule 2 liabilities within 180 days from the date on which he took over management of SPIL.
    • An amount of Rs 2.5 crores was paid by KCP as against a total consideration of Rs 30 crores. Ninety per cent of the shares were transferred by KSL to KCP and to his nominees in the following manner:

One share to KCP

 Ninety five per cent shares to Cheran Properties Limited, the appellant

One share each to Cheran Enterprises Pvt.Ltd., KCP Associates Holdings P. Ltd., CG Holdings (P) Ltd. and Cheran Holdings P. Ltd.

  • On 17 August 2004, a letter was addressed by KCP acting as the authorized signatory of the appellant to KSL. The letter specifically contained a reference to the share purchase agreement dated 19 July 2004. Since the transaction was not completed by KCP, disputes arose between the parties resulting in the commencement of arbitral proceedings. On 16 December 2009 the arbitral tribunal made its award. Under the terms of the award, a direction was issued under which KCP and SPIL were required to return documents of title and share certificates relating to 2.43 crore shares contemporaneously with KSL paying an amount of Rs 3,58,11,000 together with interest at 12% p.a. on a sum of Rs 2.55 crores.
    • KCP challenged the award of the arbitral tribunal under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The challenge was repelled by a learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court by a judgment and order dated 30 April 2015. The appeal filed by KCP was dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court on 24 January 2017. This Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition challenging the judgment of the Division Bench on 10 February 2017. The award has attained finality.
    • KSL initiated proceedings, inter alia, under Section 111 of the Companies Act, 1956 read with Sections 397, 398, 402 and 403, among other things, for rectification of the register of SPIL. NCLT allowed the petition by its order dated 6 March 2017. The decision of the NCLT was affirmed by NCLAT on 3 May 2017.
    • NCLAT held that the appellant is a nominee of KCP and holds the shares in question on his behalf. Hence, NCLT was held to be justified in entertaining the proceedings for rectification under Section 111. For coming to the conclusion that the appellant is a nominee of KCP and held the shares on his behalf, reliance has been placed on a judgment dated 29 April 2011 of the Madras High Court inter partes in an application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
    • The High Court came to the conclusion that clause 14 of the agreement dated 19 July 2004 recognise the right of KCP to transfer his holding in SPIL to a person of his choice, provided that the proposed transferee accepts the terms and conditions mentioned in the agreement for the management of SPIL together with related financial aspects covered by the agreement. The High Court held that the shares had not been purchased by the appellant as a matter of an independent right but as a nominee of KCP. The purchase of the shares was in pursuance of the agreement dated 19 July 2004. Rectification of the register was held to have been ordered by the NCLT correctly. The appeal was dismissed.
  • ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT:

Whether the person against whom the arbitral award is sought to be enforced is one who claims under a party to the agreement?

RATIO OF THE COURT

  1. In Chloro Controls this Court observed that ordinarily, an arbitration takes place between persons who have been parties to both the arbitration agreement and the substantive contract underlying it. English Law has evolved the “group of companies doctrine” under which an arbitration agreement entered into by a company within a group of corporate entities can in certain circumstances bind non-signatory affiliates. The test as formulated by this Court, noticing the position in English law, is as follows:

“Though the scope of an arbitration agreement is limited to the parties who entered into it and those claiming under or through them, the courts under the English law have, in certain cases, also applied the “group of companies doctrine”. This doctrine has developed in the international context, whereby an arbitration agreement entered into by a company, being one within a group of companies, can bind its non-signatory affiliates or sister or parent concerns, if the circumstances demonstrate that the mutual intention of all the parties was to bind both the signatories and the non-signatory affiliates. This theory has been applied in a number of arbitrations so as to justify a tribunal taking jurisdiction over a party who is not a signatory to the contract containing the arbitration agreement. [Russell on Arbitration (23rd Edn.)]

  • This evolves the principle that a non-signatory party could be subjected to arbitration provided these transactions were with group of companies and there was a clear intention of the parties to bind both, the signatory as well as the non-signatory parties. In other words, “intention of the parties” is a very significant feature which must be established before the scope of arbitration can be said to include the signatory as well as the non-signatory parties.”
  • The Court held that it would examine the facts of the case on the touch-stone of the existence of a direct relationship with a party which is a signatory to the arbitration agreement, a ‘direct commonality’ of the subject matter and on whether the agreement between the parties is a part of a composite transaction.
  • As the law has evolved, it has recognized that modern business transactions are often effectuated through multiple layers and agreements. There may be transactions within a group of companies. The circumstances in which they have entered into them may reflect an intention to bind both signatory and non-signatory entities within the same group. In holding a non-signatory bound by an arbitration agreement, the Court approaches the matter by attributing to the transactions a meaning consistent with the business sense which was intended to be ascribed to them. Therefore, factors such as the relationship of a non-signatory to a party which is a signatory to the agreement, the commonality of subject matter and the composite nature of the transaction weigh in the balance. The group of companies doctrine is essentially intended to facilitate the fulfilment of a mutually held intent between the parties, where the circumstances indicate that the intent was to bind both signatories and non-signatories. The effort is to find the true essence of the business arrangement and to unravel from a layered structure of commercial arrangements, an intent to bind someone who is not formally a signatory but has assumed the obligation to be bound by the actions of a signatory.
  • International conventions on arbitration as well as the UNCITRAL Model Law mandate that an arbitration agreement must be in writing. Section 7 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 affirms the same principle.
  • Does the requirement, as in Section 7, that an arbitration agreement be in writing exclude the possibility of binding third parties who may not be signatories to an agreement between two contracting entities? The evolving body of academic literature as well as adjudicatory trends indicate that in certain situations, an arbitration agreement between two or more parties may operate to bind other parties as well. Redfern and Hunter explain the theoretical foundation of this principle:

“..The requirement of a signed agreement in writing, however, does not altogether exclude the possibility of an arbitration agreement concluded in proper form between two or more parties also binding other parties. Third parties to an arbitration agreement have been held to be bound by (or entitled to rely on) such an agreement in a variety of ways: first, by operation of the ‘group of companies’ doctrine pursuant to which the benefits and duties arising from an arbitration agreement may in certain circumstances be extended to other members of the same group of companies; and, secondly, by operation of general rules of private law, principally on assignment, agency, and succession..”

  • The group of companies doctrine has been applied to pierce the corporate veil to locate the “true” party in interest, and more significantly, to target the creditworthy member of a group of companies. Though the extension of this doctrine is met with resistance on the basis of the legal imputation of corporate personality, the application of the doctrine turns on a construction of the arbitration agreement and the circumstances relating to the entry into and performance of the underlying contract.
  • While the alter ego principle is a rule of law which disregards the effects of incorporation or separate legal personality, in contrast the group of companies doctrine is a means of identifying the intentions of parties and does not disturb the legal personality of the entities in question.
  • The present case relates to a post award situation. The enforcement of the arbitral award has been sought against the appellant on the basis that it claims under KCP and is bound by the award. Section 35 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 postulates that an arbitral award “shall be final and binding on the parties and persons claiming under them respectively”. The expression ‘claiming under’, in its ordinary meaning, directs attention to the source of the right. The expression includes cases of devolution and assignment of interest. The expression “persons claiming under them” in Section 35 widens the net of those whom the arbitral award binds. It does so by reaching out not only to the parties but to those who claim under them, as well. The expression “persons claiming under them” is a legislative recognition of the doctrine that besides the parties, an arbitral award binds every person whose capacity or position is derived from and is the same as a party to the proceedings. Having derived its capacity from a party and being in the same position as a party to the proceedings binds a person who claims under it.
  • The principle which underlies Chloro Controls is that an arbitration agreement which is entered into by a company within a group of companies may bind non-signatory affiliates, if the circumstances are such as to demonstrate the mutual intention of the parties to bind both signatories and non-signatories. In applying the doctrine, the law seeks to enforce the common intention of the parties, where circumstances indicate that both signatories and non-signatories were intended to be bound.
  • In the present case, the arbitral award required the shares to be transmitted to the claimants. The arbitral award attained finality. The award could be enforced in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, in the same manner as if it were a decree of the Court. The award postulates a transmission of shares to the claimant. The directions contained in the award can be enforced only by moving the Tribunal for rectification in the manner contemplated by law.
  • In the present case, the arbitral award, in essence, postulates the transmission of shares from the appellant to the claimant. The only remedy available for effectuating the transmission is that which was provided in Section 111 for seeking a rectification of the register. There is, therefore, no merit in the challenge addressed by the appellant.
  • DECISION HELD BY COURT:
    • Under the provisions of Section 35, the award can be enforced in the same manner as if it were a decree of the Court. The award has attained finality. The transmission of shares as mandated by  the award could be fully effectuated by obtaining a rectification of the register under Section 111 of the Companies Act. The remedy which was resorted to was competent. The view of the NCLT, which has been affirmed by the NCLAT does not warrant interference.
    • The appeals are lacking in merit. The appeals shall stand dismissed.

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